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The Hark

the owner of more than 20% of a corporation's voting stock, a
partnership's profits interest, or the beneficial interest of a trust is
tainted by the substantial contributions of that entity.

Unrequited Gifts: The Tax Fallout
Tax cases, dealing as they do with well-aged transactions and strategies, may not often provide a source of
creative inspiration, but they certainly offer both object
lessons and useful maxims. Take the 885 Investment
Company, subject of a recent Tax Court exegesis on
defeasible gifts, jurisdictional collisions, and the tax
benefit rule. (If any of those subjects seems less than
self-defining, hang in there, and all will be explained
anon.)
The 885 Investment Company was a California
limited partnership, which in 1987 acquired some 178
acres in Sacramento. A few months prior to 885's acquisition, the Sacramento city council had adopted a
land use plan providing for the maintenance of a scenic
corridor along Interstate Highway 5. A small portion of
885's property lay within the proposed scenic corridor,
and the partnership was soon approached about its willingness to donate that portion to the city.
Lesson One: A partnership is not a taxable entity;
its charitable contributions flow through to the
partners, and each takes as his own deduction a
share of the total contribution, based upon his entitlements under the partnership agreement.
The city appeared to be serious about establishing
the scenic corridor, and towards that end it purchased, in
June 1979, some 2.33 acres within the corridor for
$73,820. All other parcels thereafter acquired within the
corridor were contributed, however, among them a slice
measuring .664 acres contributed by the 885 partnership
on December 21, 1979. That gift was conditioned, however, at the city's insistence, on ultimate use of the land
as part of the scenic corridor; in the event that such use
was not accomplished, the city had the right to "deed said
real property back to the owner.... " In respect of that gift,
885 claimed a $115,695 charitable contribution.
Maxim One: Beware of donees looking gift parcels in the mouth. This is hardly a typical reaction,
and, at the least, the partnership should have asked,
"What if... ?" and played through the possible outcomes.
In February 1981,885 agreed to donate an additional5.523 acres. That donation was subject to the same
possibility of reconveyance, should the scenic corridor
plans come to naught.
Not long thereafter, the city began to have second
thoughts about the whole scenic corridor idea. The
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prospect of state funding had evaporated, and liability
concerns had arisen. Hence it was determined in 1982 to
reconvey to 885 the 1979 and 1981 gift parcels.
Lesson Two: Governments often change their
minds. (This is a lesson, falling somewhat short of
the maxim "Governments are not to be trusted.")
But the reconveyance was complicated by further
negotiations. 885 agreed to develop and maintain the
returned parcels as a scenic corridor and to contribute to
a fund to ensure their maintenance, and, in return, the
city approved increased density for the partnership's
developable property adjacent to the corridor. Under
those conditions, the reconveyance was effected in 1983.
As returned, the gift parcels were subject to use restrictions that left no alternative but maintenance as a "scenic
landscaped corridor."
Lesson Three: The properties returned to 885 were
far different from the parcels donated in 1979 and
1981. The newly imposed use restrictions drastically reduced their values (a circumstance
astonishingly ignored in the Tax Court's analysis),
and in gaining density approvals as a condition of
its maintenance obligation, 885 obviously extracted consideration that would have defeated the
original deductions entirely, had it been bargained
for in connection with the 1979 and 1981 gifts.
The procedural setting for this adjudication was
peculiar. Owing to the IRS' failure to assert in a timely
manner a deficiency on account of the (allegedl y flawed)
1979 deduction, the tax benefits attributable to that gift
were not in issue, but the effect to the taxpayer of the
return of the 1979 gift parcel was very much in focus.
As to the 1981 gift, 885' s asserted deduction of $962,328
was entirely denied by the Service on the ground that,
on the date of the gift, the "possibility of occurrence" of
a reversion of the property to the partnership was "not
so remote as to be negligible," under applicable (and
venerable) regulations. The court agreed, as it had little
choice but to do. The "so remote as to be negligible"
standard has been applied in dozens of cases, and an
assistant Sacramento city manager testified for the
government that, at the time of the 1981 donation,
prospects for public funding of the scenic corridor were
gloomy.
Maxim Two: Tax benefits at which large donations
are aimed must be impervious to attack, except on
valuation grounds. The 1981 donation was the
main-event issue in this case, involving a challenge
to federal income tax benefits (i.e., dollars saved on
account of the 1981 donation) aggregating approximately $480,000 to the 885 partners. Had the
partnership's advisors refused to accede to the
city's requested reverter provision, the deduction
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would have been beyond challenge, except, perhaps, on valuation grounds.
The effects of the return of the 1979 property,
although by no means as dramatic financially, are a tax
student's nightmare-the stuff of which final exams are
made. On account of the reverter clause, the 1979 gift
was as defective as the later and larger donation, but the
IRS had failed to mount an attack before the statute of
limitations for that year had run. Nonetheless, the game
was far from over; the government sought to invoke the
"tax benefit rule" to mitigate its earlier neglect.
In this context, the tax benefit rule essentially
requires that where a taxpayer has had the benefit of a
previous deduction (here, the 1979 contribution), which,
in the fullness of time, turns out to be inconsistent with
a later event (the return of the 1979 parcel), income is
required to be reported in the later year. Under the Tax
Court's own prior interpretations of the rule, however, it
only applies where the prior deduction was properly
asserted. Since 885's earlier gift was flawed by the
possibility of reverter, it would seem that the
government's only remedy would have been to attack
the deduction itself prior to the running of the statute of
limitations.
Lesson Four: The judicial resolution of a tax controversy is a long and arduous road, often leading
to surprising and/or unsatisfying conclusions.
But alas, despite the Tax Court's own prior express views on the proper reach of the tax benefit rule, it
has also determined to follow cases decided by the
judicial circuit to which an appeal will run. An appeal in
the 885 case would run to the Ninth Circuit, and that
court has refused to limit the tax benefit rule to cases not
involving prior erroneous deduction. Thus the Tax Court
was constrained to hold that the return of the 1979 gift
property produced taxable income in 1983. (You might
expect something like this in "Godot Meets the Tax
Collector," but this is real life.)
Maxim Three: Courts frequently overlook things.
Having concluded that the 1983 recovery of the
parcel gifted in 1979 is subject to inclusion in income,
the final task facing the court was to determine how
much that inclusion should be. Ignoring entirely the fact
that the property recovered in 1983, unlike the 1979 gift,
was burdened with elaborate development and use
restrictions, and further, that the 1983 negotiations might
well have been considered a "new deal" vitiating entirely
the "reverter" construction on which tax benefit is
premised, the court determined the value of the reconveyed two-thirds acre by reference to the unencumbered
2.33 acres purchased by the city from an unrelated
landowner for $73,820 in 1979! The prorated value
arrived at for 885's .664-acre parcel-$21,04O-is thus

October 1990

Fort~

the result of an exquisitely irrelevant computation. (The
tax arbitrage was not bad, even so, since the $115,695
deduction in 1979 produced about $81,000 in tax
benefits [at 70%] and the $21,040 deemed recovery
produced a 1983 liability of aoout $10,500 [at 50%].)
What can one say about all of this? Maybe that if
you have a prospective partnership transaction, absorb
the lessons, observe the maxims, and don't let anyone
talk aoout the 885 case. And should it come up, assure
them that you consider it a perfect example of the kind
of planning you intend not to abet. 885 Investment Co.,
95 T.C._, No. 12 (August 16, 1990).-William T. Hutton

Federal Claims Court Awards
Millions in Damages to
Landowners for Regulatory
Taking
In two recent decisions with potentially far-reaching effects on government programs to preserve wetlands, a Federal claims court in Florida has awarded
$1,029,000 and $2,658,000 in damages to two respective
landowners for an alleged "regulatory taking" of their
property. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,
1990 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 281 (filed July 23, 1990);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 1990 U.S. Cl.
Ct. LEXIS 280 (filed July 23, 1990). In ooth cases, the
court held that the federal government's denial of permits to fill wetlands on the landowner's properties, pursuant to section 404 of the Federal Clean Water Act (see
The Back Forty, September 1990), resulted in a taking
that required the government to pay just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment. These decisions are significant because they are among the first to award
damages to a landowner as a result of permit denial under
the Section 404 permitting program. In fact, in United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 128
(1985), the United States Supreme Court specifically
declined to award damages for a taking claim under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
The just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment is intended to bar the government from forcing a
few people to bear public burdens that "in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Thus, when a particular governmental regulation causes
values incident to property to be diminished by a "certain
magnitude," the United States Supreme Court has held
that the government has in effect "taken" the property
owner's land by inverse condemnation, requiring just
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